Viennese football and the German Wehrmacht - between "duty" and evasion by Forster, David & Spitaler, Georg
www.ssoar.info
Viennese football and the German Wehrmacht -
between "duty" and evasion
Forster, David; Spitaler, Georg
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Forster, D., & Spitaler, G. (2015). Viennese football and the German Wehrmacht - between "duty" and evasion.
Historical Social Research, 40(4), 310-330. https://doi.org/10.12759/hsr.40.2015.4.310-330
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Historical Social Research 40 (2015) 4, 310-330 │© GESIS 
DOI: 10.12759/hsr.40.2015.4.310-330 
Viennese Football and the German Wehrmacht – 
Between “Duty” and Evasion 
David Forster & Georg Spitaler ∗ 
Abstract: »Der Wiener Fußball und die Deutsche Wehrmacht – zwischen 
,Pflichterfüllung’ und Entziehung«. After 1945, stories about the Wehrmacht 
and football were integrated into the popular political history of anti-Nazi re-
sistance in the newly formed Second Austrian Republic. This includes, for ex-
ample, the alleged deployment of the team from SK Rapid to the front lines 
after their victory in the final of the 1941 German wartime football champion-
ship. Against the background of these myths, which were sometimes circulated 
even in football historiography, this contribution examines the similarities and 
differences between Viennese football after the 1938 Anschluss and the other 
regions of the Nazi Reich: How was the conscription of Viennese footballers 
accomplished and how involved were the players in the soldiers’ football 
teams? Did the Viennese players enjoy the support of local Nazi functionaries 
or – like some of their national teammates – the help of “Reich Coach” Sepp 
Herberger in being held back from the front lines? What strategies did Viennese 
football players and clubs use in order to avoid being sent to the front, or to 
remain active as players? And to what extent were Viennese players or football 
officials involved in Nazi crimes during the war? This essay is based on the re-
sults of the research projects “Green-White under the Swastika. SK Rapid under 
National Socialism” and “Austrian victims of Nazi military justice.” 
Keywords: Football, Vienna, Wehrmacht, National Socialism, World War II. 
1.  Introduction 
On June 22, 1941, the day of the German attack on the Soviet Union, the 
Viennese football team SK Rapid Wien won the final of the 1941 German 
wartime football championship at Berlin’s Olympiastadion over Schalke 04 4-3. 
In Austria’s popular football memory, this victory is associated with a narrative 
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of victimhood. As Leo Schidrowitz writes in his 1951 chronicle of Austrian 
football during the 1941-42 season:  
The Hütteldorfers plummeted back. The explanation for their poor perfor-
mance [...] was attributed to the fact that invisible masterminds had caused 
approximately eight men from the Rapid eleven to be displaced away from 
Vienna. [...] In Vienna, it was thought that it had been deemed unwelcome in 
the Altreich that the German football championship had moved to Vienna and 
that a repetition of this event should be prevented (Schidrowitz 1951, 230-1).  
Many of the popular myths surrounding the Wehrmacht and football in Vienna, 
like those of the alleged transfer of Rapid’s championship team to the front lines, 
revolve to this day around narratives of victimhood, evasion, and compulsory 
“duty.” After 1945, some of these stories were even included in the popular polit-
ical resistance history and the thesis of Austria as the first victim of the Nazis. 
Against the background of these circulated myths, which can even persist in 
modern football research,1 we want to take a closer look at some of the questions 
related to these stories: How had the conscription of Viennese football players 
been carried out after the outbreak of the war in 1939? What kind of support did 
the players receive from the local Nazi functionaries or from Nazi sports policy to 
keep them away from the front? What strategies did Viennese football players 
and clubs use in order to avoid deployment to the front or to remain active as 
players? And to what extent were Viennese players or football officials involved 
in Nazi crimes during the war? This contribution ends with a look at the football-
related culture of memory in postwar Austria and some conclusions on the com-
parison of the Viennese situation with that of the Altreich.2 This essay is based 
on research projects in which the authors participated on the history of SK 
Rapid under Nazism (Rosenberg and Spitaler 2011) and the Nazi military justice 
system (Manoschek 2003; Baumann et al. 2008) as well as research findings that 
were published as part of the series “Football under the Swastika,” which has 
been ongoing since 2003 in the football magazine ballesterer. 
2.  Outbreak of the War and Conscriptions 
Although the local championship in the Ostmark was briefly suspended after 
the outbreak of the war in September 1939, serious upheavals were initially 
avoided. In the media’s sports coverage, the “normality” of football operations 
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was emphasized, as for example in the Viennese edition of the Völkischer 
Beobachter on September 5, 1939:  
The population of Vienna – as it was in the entire great Reich – went [...] to the 
sports fields. [...] But we want to be honest: Some people are trembling! Not be-
cause of the British threat of war, but solely over whether Rapid or Admira, 
Wacker or the Sportklub will leave the football field victorious in the end” (7). 
The leadership of the National Socialist League of the Reich for Physical Exer-
cise (NSRL) reorganized the regional championships in the German Reich into 
a wartime championship in late October 1939 and introduced additional chang-
es to football operations, such as reducing the bureaucratic obstacles for player 
transfers and facilitating the formation of “combined teams” or Spielgemein-
schaften (Marschik 2008, 310-2). Those players who had been called to mili-
tary service should present themselves to the public not only as football play-
ers, but also as soldiers, and were therefore required to show their military 
affiliation by sewing the Wehrmacht eagle emblem onto their jerseys. 
The Viennese clubs may have been affected to varying degrees initially by 
the conscriptions. The Fußball-Sonntag reported in October 1939 that 17 play-
ers from FK Austria Wien had already been drafted (Marschik 1998, 161). Karl 
Sesta, one of the stars of the team, had already been serving in the Wehrmacht 
since May 1939 (Neues Wiener Tagblatt, May 5, 1939, 6). From SK Rapid, only 
a few players were drafted in 1939: Only five of 41 players are confirmed by the 
German Wehrmacht research service (Deutsche Dienststelle 2008, 2010), most of 
whom would have been drafted later than other prominent football players in the 
Altreich (cf. for example Fischer and Lindner 1999, 112). This is confirmed by a 
1939 list of the Wehrmacht service ranks of Reich selection trainees from the 
Football Office (Fachamt Fußball). The Viennese players were more likely to be 
involved in “civil” or non-combat positions.3 According to the statements of 
German player Fritz Walter, after the winter of 1940, almost all of the national 
team players from the Altreich were called up to the Wehrmacht (Fischer and 
Lindner 1999, 112), while from the Ostmark, probably only FK Austria player 
Josef “Pepi” Stroh was serving at that time (Marschik 2008, 313). In any case, 
most of the serving active players from the famous Viennese clubs were sta-
tioned neither at the front nor too far away from Vienna in the early years of 
the war, and they could still attend football matches relatively regularly be-
cause of exemptions from duty (ibid., 314). 
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3.  Off to the Front? The “Punishment Thesis” and War 
History 
But what about the “non-sporting revenge” thesis, which states that “within a 
few months, almost all of the winning team Rapid [were] ordered to the front” 
(Marschik 1998, 361)? This story seems to have already been circulating dur-
ing the war (Doubek 2003, 237); its genesis is grounded in the football rivalry 
between Vienna and the Altreich that took place within the “Greater German 
Reich.” The Viennese football teams, which were very successful in the interwar 
period, played an important role in the construction of regional identity even after 
the Anschluss. “Club fanaticism” (Oswald 2008, 216-51) was high among the 
Viennese football supporters, and questions over the “right” playing system – the 
Viennese pyramid system versus the “W-M” system practiced by the German 
national team under Sepp Herberger – were fiercely debated in the sporting press 
(cf. for example John 2008, 212-5). Even the local Nazi sports bureaucracy was 
involved in these disputes.4 The “Sportgauführer” and Vienna Deputy Mayor 
Thomas Kozich was a fanatical advocate of local football against alleged dis-
crimination on the part of the football officials in the Altreich in such areas as 
scheduling, controversial refereeing decisions, and the dispute over the playing 
system (Marschik 2008, 483-91; Rosenberg and Spitaler 2011, 110-23). 
In the autumn of 1940, in the wake of the Tschammer Cup match between 
SK Rapid and SV Fürth on October 20, and the friendly match of Floridsdorfer 
Admira against Schalke 04 on November 17, “anti-Prussian” riots erupted on 
the Viennese football fields with far-reaching consequences for Nazi sports 
policy in Vienna. At the “reconciliation match” between the two opponents 
from the 1939 final, Admira and Schalke, wild brawls broke out in the stands 
and in front of the Vienna Prater stadium; after the match, Gauleiter Baldur 
von Schirach’s car was attacked and damaged (Marschik 2008, 469-74; 
Marschik 2014). This unrest led in December 1940 to a crisis visit by the Staff 
Director of the NSRL, Guido von Mengden, to Baldur von Schirach’s office in 
Vienna, and an extensive correspondence between the different representatives 
of the Nazi sports bureaucracy. Shortly before Mengdens’s visit, Sportgaufüh-
rer Thomas Kozich authored a “Report on the Development and Reasons for 
the Mood of the Sporting Public” for Baldur von Schirach. In it, he mentioned 
several incidents that have led to an “opposition between sports followers in 
Vienna and the Altreich” as well as the “palpable perception among sports 
followers […] that Viennese sport is being treated badly by the respective 
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Reich offices.”5 During his visit, Guido von Mengden commented on Kozich’s 
allegations. He laid the reasons for the “disparities” between the Reich sports 
leadership and the Viennese sports clubs primarily on “the development and 
steering of Viennese sports life in the time before the Anschluss” because “Jew-
ry have had a significant share in the management of the Viennese professional 
clubs.” Then he came to address the issue of the call-ups:  
Von Mengden observed [...] that the Reichssportführer wants the best athletes 
also to be the best soldiers. It was noticed that the first team from SK Rapid, 
down to a player, still held their old peacetime occupations, while in the majori-
ty of other clubs, more than half of the players on the first team were soldiers.”6  
Apparently, von Mengden’s accusation led to investigations in Vienna. Two 
months later, Schirach’s staff member Günther Kaufmann, after consultation 
with Kozich, let von Mengden know that there would be no favors at the 
Viennese clubs:  
On the occasion of your last visit to Vienna you made me aware that remarka-
bly few leading members of the Viennese sport clubs Rapid and Admira had 
previously complied with their military service. I have verified this message in 
detail, and can state that it is incorrect. A very significant proportion of the 
members of these sport clubs has been called up for military service, another 
part is in the armament factories and is committed there. As far as the individ-
ual members of the sports clubs who have not yet been called up, it is because 
the local conscripted age groups had not already been called to service in mass 
before the outbreak of the war for short-term training, as had been the case in 
the Altreich.7 
A short time earlier, the stars of the Rapid team – Franz “Bimbo” Binder, Hans 
Pesser, Stefan Skoumal, and Rudolf Raftl – had been called up; a connection 
with von Mengden’s intervention is quite probable. All four were initially 
serving in Reserve Signal Detachment 17 in Vienna, in the Breitensee barracks, 
which was not too far away from Rapid’s pitch (Deutsche Dienststelle 2005). 
The newspapers reported extensively on the drafted Rapid players (cf. for ex-
ample Das Kleine Blatt, February 6, 1941). On April 2, 1941, the Kleine Blatt 
noted: “Rapid goalkeeper Rudolf Raftl was called up for military service, serv-
ing in the same company as Binder, Pesser and Skoumal” (10). Even in the 
Altreich the conscription of the Rapid players drew attention: The Kicker (Feb-
ruary 11, 1941, 14) reported on the service of the players in an article titled 
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14 February 1941. 
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“Radioman Binder”; two issues later, the magazine showed a picture of the 
uniformed player under the title: “Bimbo also knows how to make snacks” 
(Kicker, February 25, 1941, 6). For sports operations in the Gauliga and the 
Greater German Championship, however, the conscriptions changed nothing 
for the time being: Binder could contest the rest of the season’s games; Raftl 
and Skoumal only sat out one friendly match, and Pesser was sidelined by a 
torn ligament from April 13 to May 31 (Pichler 2010). 
Service in a reserve detachment seems to have been typical of the top 
Viennese players in the early war years. Sports journalist Ludwig Stecewicz 
noted that the Viennese football clubs generally tried to have their players 
deferred or advocated that they were not put into infantry companies, but in 
less combat-related detachments (uniform stores, typing pools, military hospi-
tals) (Stecewicz 1996, 242). This practice is not likely to have differed too 
much from the Altreich, as the example of Schalke 04 shows (Goch and Silber-
bach 2005, 149-50). 
With the beginning of the “war of extermination” on the Eastern Front in 
June 1941, however, it became more difficult for sport clubs to keep players 
close or to obtain leaves of absences for games. This was also true for Rapid: 
Binder, for example, was deployed to regular service in November 1941; Raftl, 
Pesser, and Skoumal scarcely played in the 1941-42 season after they had been 
transferred in August 1941 to other Wehrmacht divisions (Deutsche 
Dienststelle 2005; Pichler 2010). 
Even if the number of Rapid players deployed to the front increased after 
winning the Greater German championship, the official documents still do not 
prove the “punishment hypothesis” (Spitaler 2008, 550-2) that was spun after 
1945 (Forster and Spitaler 2005; Rosenberg and Spitaler 2011, 210-20). Rather, 
a comparison with teams from the Altreich speaks to the fact that the escalation 
of the war constituted the most important factor for ending the preferential 
treatment of football players. Both SK Rapid’s final opponents Schalke 04 as 
well as their semi-final opponents Dresdner SC had to do without key players 
after the 1940-41 season due to military deployments (Goch and Silberbach 
2005, 337; Bitzer and Wilting 2003, 70). The magazine Fussball (January 
1942, 2) reported in early 1942 that:  
Rapid [and Dresdner SC] only succumbed to what had already happened to 
hundreds of German football clubs before them and what in the future proba-
bly no German sports association will be spared. The demands of the front 
precede everything else, and even our sport has to pay them its tribute.  
Rapid star Franz Binder was moved in late 1942 to a paramedics training unit; in 
early 1943, he received the order to march east (Deutsche Dienststelle 2005), and 
could then only participate in games with his team in exceptional circumstances. 
From the autumn of 1942, the absence of men fit for military service from 
the playing fields became increasingly apparent in Vienna (Marschik 2008, 
388). The call-ups presented teams with a difficult personnel situation, as did 
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casualties among the Viennese footballers. FK Austria Wien player and mem-
ber of the Austrian Wunderteam of the 1930s Karl Gall, drafted in 1942, was 
killed by a mine on the Eastern Front in February 1943; his club colleague 
Franz Riegler, a two-time national player for “Greater Germany,” died in Feb-
ruary 1945 of injuries he suffered during a bombing raid on Vienna (Forster et 
al. 2011, 63; German War Graves Commission 2010). Rapid striker August 
Fellner fell in December 1944 on the Western Front, while his club colleagues 
Wilhelm Holec and Engelbert Uridil were listed as missing from the summer of 
1944 and February 1945, respectively (Rosenberg and Spitaler 2011, 242). 
The clubs in any case took advantage of the relaxation of transfer rules and 
made do with guest players, returnees from the front, and youth. In the 1942-43 
season, SK Rapid had to use a 35-man squad, including eight goalkeepers, 
while FK Austria used 33 players (Forster 2011, 81). Yet for Austria, “barely 
eleven people [were] mustered for the first team, while the reserves were com-
pletely unthinkable”; at the Vienna Derby on 6 December 1942, the FK Austria 
team officials “had to go through the grandstands at the Rapid pitch to look for 
the appropriate forces” (Fonje and Langer 1962, 122). 
But even in the late years of the war, there were still opportunities for the 
betterment of individual clubs. First Vienna FC, regional champions from 1942 
to 1944, had a comparatively strong squad thanks to influential patrons in the 
military (Marschik 1998, 173-4). In addition, some Rapid players were sta-
tioned in Vienna or the surrounding area. Thus, for example, Leopold 
Gernhardt and Franz Kaspirek served together in a hospital and were still used 
regularly from 1942; goalkeeper Rudolf Raftl was in Vienna in 1942 and 
played regularly again from the 1943-44 season (Interview Leopold Gernhardt, 
2005; Deutsche Dienststelle 2005, 2010; Pichler 2010). According to player 
Alfred Körner, Rapid could still have a certain influence on the stationing of 
the players in the later years: “They helped with the exemptions, so that we 
boys were at least in the vicinity. For example, [Ernst] Happel, [Franz] Prak, 
who were in the Breitensee barracks – Rapid could make it so that one was 
always nearby” (Ardelt and Marschik 1995, 87). 
Viennese players who were part of Sepp Herberger’s “Greater German se-
lection” could additionally hope for the support of the Reichstrainer. However, 
after 1941 at the latest, it became increasingly difficult for Herberger to obtain 
waivers for players on his team. His attempts to hold together a strong team 
and “to ensure that his players survived the war as unscathed as possible” were 
known as “operation Heldenklau” (literally “hero theft”; Grüne 1999, 114). In 
the winter of 1941-42, Herberger created a list of 25 players with alleged com-
bat experience and awards who should be recalled from the front, which, after 
some negotiation with the Army High Command (OHK), was arranged in most 
cases (ibid., 120). In Herberger’s records, there is also an indication of a player 
shortage for the international match on January 18, 1942 in Zagreb, for which 
several Viennese players were given leave permits by the Wehrmacht at the last 
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minute. Herberger later cryptically noted: “Wagner call-up 18 January 1942 
(hotline); the ‘Heldenklau’ is on the prowl.”8 This probably refers to Franz 
Wagner, who, according to information from the Deutsche Dienststelle, was 
ultimately conscripted by the Wehrmacht on March 16, 1942 (Deutsche 
Dienststelle 2005) and could still participate in this international game and the 
following game in Vienna against Switzerland. 
In a listing of the 1942 national team players, probably created in April 
1943, Herberger wrote that of 52 players, three men were listed as “u.k.” (“de-
ferred”), two players after injuries were “a.v.” (“fit for work”), eight after inju-
ries in reserve troops, three men in the Navy air defense or Luftwaffe, 28 men 
“in the East,” and three men (including Fritz Walter) were at a field unit in 
France. Five men – all Viennese – were, according to Herberger, “still in the 
homeland,” including Rapid player Wagner and Schmaus from First Vienna 
FC.9 Both would suffer “a serious knee and ankle injury” and are therefore at 
the moment “fit for garrison service.”10 
4.  Viennese Footballers on the Military Teams 
With the outbreak of war, the importance of sport also rose within the Wehr-
macht: Football should not only entertain the soldiers as spectators, but also serve 
them in return and increase the attractiveness of individual units. Football teams 
made up of talented enthusiasts, amateurs and/or former league players existed in 
all of the branches of the Wehrmacht (Forster 2004, 38). The makeup and activi-
ties of the teams were as inconsistent as their structure: In addition to loose 
football teams that only occasionally competed, there were also established 
select teams that played friendlies against other military teams and traditional 
clubs or competed in their own military league. There were even military sports 
clubs that were represented in the Gau leagues and in the Tschammer Cup. 
The most famous soldiers’ team from the Ostmark (later officially known as 
the “Alps and Danube Reichsgaue”) was LSV Markersdorf, which played in 
1943-44 in the Vienna area class and finished in sixth place (Marschik 2008, 
372). The excellent makeup of LSV Markersdorf, which included many (for-
mer) players from the traditional Viennese teams, such as Admira player Karl 
Durspekt, Rapid players Lukas Aurednik and Max Merkel, as well as Karl 
                                                             
8  DFB-Archiv, Sepp Herberger Collection, files/letters 263: The German National Team during 
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9  DFB Archive, Sepp Herberger Collection, files/letters 263: The German National Team during 
the War – part IV (1941-42), report [fragment, probably April 1943]. 
10  DFB Archive, Sepp Herberger Collection, files/letters 263: The German National Team during 
the War – part VI (1942-1967), report [fragment, probably 1943]. 
HSR 40 (2015) 4  │  318 
Sesta and Franz Riegler (“Franz Riegler II”) from FK Austria, prompted the 
Neue Wiener Tagblatt (February 20, 1944, 7) to declare: “it’s nice to continue 
to see the Viennese players.”11 With so many Viennese soldier-players, recalls 
Matthias Marschik, the team was “in light of the prominence, rather like a 
practice match of the Ostmark select team” (Marschik 2008, 374). The participa-
tion of ex-professionals in Wehrmacht sports can be seen in many contemporary 
newspaper reports. In December 1940, for example, Vienna Military District 
Command 17 defeated the SS Totenkopf-Regiment Krakow by a score of 11 to 2, 
thanks not least to four goals from Georg Schors and one goal from Walter 
Probst; both players originally played for SK Rapid (Neues Wiener Tagblatt, 
December 12, 1940, 8). In September 1941, the Pfarrwiese, Rapid’s home field, 
served as the venue for a Wehrmacht sports festival, the high point of which was 
a game between the Breitensee barracks (where Franz Binder was still serving at 
the time) and the Military District Command (Neues Wiener Tagblatt, September 
24, 1941, 4). In 1942, the team for Reserve Hospital 1a fielded Rapid players 
Leopold Gernhardt and Franz Kaspirek and Wacker player Ernst Reitermeier 
(Wiener Neueste Nachrichten, August 27, 1942, 6; and September 1, 1942, 6). 
Aurednik played in 1942 at the Amsterdam Olympic Stadium as part of a Luft-
waffe team against a selection from TSV 1860 München (Forster et al. 2011, 65). 
Larger matches were often held between Wehrmacht select teams from entire 
cities; Max Merkel played in one such game in July 1941 on a Viennese soldiers’ 
side against Berlin (Neues Wiener Tagblatt, July 16, 1941, 3).  
One of the most famous military teams of the German Reich was the “Roten 
Jäger” of fighter pilot Hermann Graf, who founded a football team in his fight-
er squadron in 1940 to which he could steer numerous footballers of interna-
tional standing, including the Viennese players Josef Stroh and Franz Hanreiter 
(Admira) (Herzog 2008, 67-148). 
The soldiers’ games may have been well received by the audience, which, 
for Vienna, Marschik differentiates between the “general sports audience and 
the organizers” on one side and the “club supporters” on the other. The latter 
group would not have necessarily been enthusiastic (Marschik 2008, 373). 
Even in the occupied countries, attendance at the military games was some-
times considerable, though presumably many Wehrmacht soldiers filled the 
stadiums and guest appearances by traditional clubs or individual stars in par-
ticular proved to be crowd pullers. In occupied Paris, where 56 teams from all 
branches of the Wehrmacht competed for a city championship in the summer of 
1941, 40,000 spectators came to a friendly match between a soldiers’ side (with 
Spilka from SC Wacker Vienna and Gora from Red Star) against Schalke 04 in 
the Parc des Princes. The end of 1942 saw 20,000 spectators at a match ending 
in a 4-4 draw between the Paris soldiers’ side and a mixed team with players 
                                                             
11  On the team roster, cf. Wiener Neueste Nachrichten (November 30, 1943, 6; February 2, 944, 3). 
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from TSV 1860 München and soldiers stationed in Bavaria, including the for-
mer Helfort player Chlad (Forster et al. 2011, 64-5). A similar crowd mobilized 
in May 1944 for a match between the Vienna army team (with, among other 
players, Aurednik, Binder, Kaspirek, and Hans Kovar) and Honved in Budapest 
(Wiener Neueste Nachrichten, May 19, 1944, 5). 
Apart from the organized games, there were opportunities for drafted football-
ers to play in the front areas in looser contexts, although this represented “for the 
top athletes, at least viewed in retrospect, both recreation and annoyance” 
(Marschik 2008, 377). Admira player Karl Kowanz said in a 1995 interview:  
Everywhere there have been places for [military] exercise, practice, we played a 
bit there, but I’d had 46 or 47 kilos [...]. In 2, 3 months, the weight was gone and 
the strength, and a disenchantment was there. And if someone comes, it’s: 
‘come on, let’s play a bit – ‘No, I’m happy if I can lie down a bit’ (ibid., 377-8).  
Stories about prominent footballers at the front could in any case be exploited 
for propaganda purposes, as shown by a report on Franz Binder in the Vienna 
edition of the Völkischer Beobachter (June 2, 1943, 6):  
[T]he good ‘Bimbo’ plays again, albeit in another region and not with the habit-
ual regularity of the past. That he – who has famously been fulfilling his sol-
dier’s duty in the East for a long time – has not forgotten his old (football) love, 
and also his game, and above all his shooting with his old championship control, 
is apparent from a letter from the East, and will please friends of Rapid and 
Viennese football, but certainly also the whole German football community. 
5.  Evasion 
A dramatic and dangerous way to escape from being sent as a soldier to the 
front, or at least temporarily achieve a disability, was so-called self-mutilation. 
Self-mutilation included both injuries that a Wehrmacht member inflicted upon 
himself, as well as those that were inflicted on him by another person. Nazi 
military justice pursued this form of draft evasion as “undermining military 
strength” and punished them with death, or in less serious cases, with a jail or 
prison sentence (Fritsche 2003, 196). 
Some Viennese footballers attempted, entirely or temporarily, to escape 
their service in Hitler’s army through self-mutilation. The most famous case is 
probably that of Ernst Stojaspal, who became an Austrian football star after 
1945 (member of the 1954 World Cup third-place team; five-time top scorer 
with FK Austria Wien) (Forster 2003a, 42-4). Born in 1925, Stojaspal played 
on the first team of SG Reichsbahn (Ostbahn XI) at age 14. In 1943 he was 
called up to deploy to the Eastern Front. In the summer of 1944, he met his 
friend Karl Lauterbach in a Viennese café. He knew Lauterbach, a communist 
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and avowed anti-Nazi, from their time in school together and from football 
games there.12 In court, Stojaspal later said for the record:  
During my furlough from the front, I also came to the Cafe Weber to visit 
friends. There I saw many soldiers in plaster casts. I met Lauterbach, who also 
wore a plaster cast, and to my question of what had happened, he answered 
that he had allowed his arm to be broken.13  
At the end of June 1944, Stojaspal allowed Lauterbach to break his “arm by 
jumping thereupon,” although he told the medical officer afterwards that he 
“had fallen on the stairs.”14 But in the summer of 1944, the Nazi military courts 
had become aware of “the self-mutilation occurring in Vienna like an epidem-
ic,” as Kriegsgerichtsrat Dr. Leopold Breitler expressed it,15 and started target-
ed investigations. Two members of the Court Martial of Division 177 in Vien-
na – the German Oberfeldrichter Dr. Karl Everts as investigator and prosecutor 
as well as the Austrian-born Breitler as judge – were particularly prominent in 
the conviction and condemnation of many Viennese self-mutilators (Forster 
2007). The group around Karl Lauterbach was caught and put on trial. Judge 
Breitler condemned Stojaspal to eight years’ imprisonment, although prosecu-
tor Everts had requested ten years. The young footballer’s defense attorney was 
initially a certain Dr. Eckerl [no first name given] – this was most likely attor-
ney Dr. Bruno Eckerl,16 who had been the president (Vereinsführer) of Stojas-
pal’s later club FK Austria Wien since October 1938 (Fussball-Sonntag, Octo-
ber 16, 1938, 6). Eckerl repeatedly helped footballers in legal matters, as he 
had for example in 1938 for FK Austria star Karl Sesta in the “Aryanization” of 
a bakery.17 Stojaspal’s friend Karl Lauterbach was convicted of four counts of 
self-mutilation, sentenced to death and on 7 February 1945 executed at the 
Kagran firing range, where prosecutor Everts took part in the execution as 
“head of enforcement.”18 Stojaspal remained in prison until the end of the war 
and began his career with FK Austria in 1945. The football star was also one of a 
minority of self-mutilators who were accepted as Nazi victims by the Republic of 
                                                             
12  Archive of the Vienna Schule 1110, Pachmayergasse 6, Lauterbach and Stojaspal school data 
sheets; Maria Musial interview [aunt of Karl Lauterbach], 2003. 
13  DÖW 6054, court of Division 177, III 59/44, Criminal case against Grenadier Georg Gabmay-
er and 42 others, 26 October 1944. 
14  Ibid. 
15  The term “epidemic” was common in the context of cases of self-mutilation in Vienna at the 
Court of Division No. 177, as many of Judge Breitler’s case filings show. Cf., for example: 
ÖSta/AdR, DWM 135/5, court of Division 177, III 78/1944 Rudolf Sobotka procedings. 
16  According to the Lehmann address book, at least in 1942, only one lawyer named Eckerl 
practiced in Vienna, namely Dr. Bruno Eckerl <http://www.digital.wienbibliothek.at/wbrobv/ 
periodical/pageview/279633> (Accessed April 15, 2013). 
17  ÖStA/AdR, E-uReang VVSt, HA-1055, Kt. 258, verbatim from memory on the concluded 
purchase agreement, 23 September 1938. 
18  ÖSta/AdR, DWM 135/5, court of Division 177, III 78/1944, record of the death sentence, 7 
February 1945. 
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Austria and received compensation. The relevant authorities believed Stojaspal’s 
argument that the military court sentencing had taken place “because I acted with 
about 40 comrades against the Nazi regime and campaigned for a free, democrat-
ic Austria.” The public health officer diagnosed a prison-related rheumatism 
and classified the “reduction in earning capacity” of the professional footballer, 
who had just become the Austrian top goal scorer for the fourth time, at 50 
percent.19 
Fortunately, the self-mutilation of the former Rapid striker Walter Probst 
remained undetected. Probst, who had played for Wacker München in 1938-39 
and was traded to FK Austria in 1939 (Forster et al. 2011, 65), explained in an 
interview how he could avoid his transfer to the front: “I’d had a friend who 
was a doctor [...] who gave me an anesthetic. Beat [the] knee [...], meniscus, 
broken cruciate ligament, flail joint” (Interview Walter Probst, 2006, cf. Hirt 
and Spitaler 2006, 36-7). At his reporting station, he faked an accident:  
We were deferred to Military District Command 17, in the [former Austrian] 
War Ministry. There to first I had to supply the cafeterias. I took a witness 
with me [...], and then I went down on the iron stairs at the War Ministry and 
just laid there [...] and went straight to the hospital (ibid.).  
As Probst tells it, he was indeed suspected and interrogated but ultimately not 
prosecuted for lack of evidence (ibid.). Likewise undetected went the “undermin-
ing of military strength” of Admira player Franz Konecny, who, after being 
wounded on the Eastern Front, “inflicted or allowed to be inflicted a recurrence 
of the injury” and was covered by the military health administration and his club, 
so that he could even continue playing for his club (Marschik 2014a, 100-6). 
Similar incidents were reported by the former Red Star player Ludwig Her-
manek, who was temporarily deployed during the war as a clerk in the Vienna 
military district command and used this function to support other footballers in 
obtaining “deferred” positions. He warned clubs such as SC Wacker of the 
impending conscription of their players so that they could prepare and give the 
player a fresh set of “plaster shanks” to put on for the muster (Interview Lud-
wig Hermanek 2011). 
Self-mutilation was a very risky way to evade conscription, so there were 
other organized attempts at deception in order to obtain deferrals and sick leave 
for players. In this context the case of Curt Reinisch is especially famous. Rei-
nisch, a member of First Vienna FC, was (in his own words) personnel officer 
of the Vienna military health administration,20 who used his function to get 
players “classified as typists or corpsmen in the various hospitals, or to bargain 
with physicians to feign injuries or extend hospital stays arbitrarily” (Marschik 
                                                             
19  WStLA, Serie 1.3.2.208.A36, Ernst Stojaspal victim assistance request, 1952. Cf. Forster 
(2003, 667-9). 
20  WStLA G 103-5/1-6, Provincial Court Vienna Vg 6e Vr 196/51 Karl Everts, letter from Ing. 
Curt Reinisch to the People’s Court Vienna, 21 November 1945. 
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1998, 242). Through his interventions, Reinisch particularly helped First Vien-
na FC, which in the later years of the war was temporarily the strongest team in 
the Ostmark or the “Alps and Danube Reichsgaue,” but according to Reinisch, 
other clubs benefitted from his activities as well (Ardelt and Marschik 1995, 
109). Vienna FC’s strong personnel contingent led in August 1943 to an anony-
mous complaint from an “upright German” about “the improper condition of 
some Viennese football clubs”:  
One finds, most notably on Vienna [FC], for example, players seeking to es-
cape their present duties as soldiers for the Fatherland. [...] Word of this injus-
tice and swindling has gotten around in the [Viennese] public. For a long time, 
there have been World War participants – fathers, even grandfathers drafted, 
who carry out their duty at the front and such young healthy men are in the 
hinterland – who actually belong at the front? [...] The same with trainer Fritz 
Gschweidl. Was never, ever drafted.21  
The note was forwarded to Reinisch for review who was able to suppress it 
(Marschik 1998, 243). In August 1944, Reinisch was arrested by the Greater 
Vienna Army Patrol (Heeresstreife) and interrogated and threatened by Ober-
feldrichter Karl Everts and his henchmen.22 According to his statements, he 
spent several months in 1944 in detention awaiting trial,23 but was released for 
lack of evidence.24 
In other cases, it can only be speculated whether stays at field and other 
hospitals for the “typical” football-related injuries were also partially the results 
of draft evasion through self-mutilation or deceit. With Rapid, for example, 
such practices could be suspected due to the institutional proximity of the club 
to important doctors and some unusual medical histories, but there is of course 
no concrete evidence for this. In Franz Binder’s medical history, two similar 
episodes can be found: The Neue Wiener Tagblatt (November 12, 1941, 4) 
reported on a hospital stay due to a heart condition, but Binder’s son cannot 
remember if his father had ever had any heart problems (Interview Franz Bind-
er Jr. 2010). In November 1943, after his deployment to the Eastern Front, 
Binder had an appendectomy; his son said in an interview:  
That was the chief physician from Hanusch Hospital, which was the [...] re-
serve hospital [...]. And there was the Rapid club doctor, who had taken out 
his healthy appendix. [...] That was three month’s sick leave and then off to 
France. No more Russia, but France. [...] So that was the only time really 
                                                             
21  DÖW 20.360, anonymous handwritten note to Vienna Military District Command, 9 August 
1943. 
22  WStLA G 103-5/1-6, Provincial Court Vienna Vg 6e Vr 196/51 Karl Everts, examination of 
witnesses, Ing. Kurt Reinisch, 19 January 1946. Cf. Forster 2997, 50. 
23  DÖW 20.100/9450, KZ-Verbands-Akt Ing. Kurt Reinisch. 
24  DÖW 8.393, “Factual findings” report for former members of the Austrian civil and military 
resistance. 
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where someone helped him; where the doctor said, ‘Well, you’re not going to 
Russia anymore’ (ibid.).  
In an affidavit from 1946, Binder described the course of events himself: “[In] 
November 1943, I came to Vienna on leave; during this time in Vienna I had to 
undergo an appendectomy to not go right back to the front again. This operation 
was carried out in the Res[erve] Hospital 1a.”25 It is striking that three additional 
Rapid players – Raftl (December 1941), Johann Hofstätter (November 1943) and 
Franz Knor (July 1944) – underwent an appendectomy during the war years (Das 
Kleine Blatt, December 9, 1941; July 11, 1944; Wiener Neueste Nachrichten, 
November 26, 1943, 6). Whether this was potentially done in an attempt to keep 
these players from the front is speculative, however. 
Notes pertaining to cases of “undermining military strength” in Rapid can 
also be found in the denazification files after 1945. The player Hermann Dvo-
racek testified that coach Leopold Nitsch had “used membership [in the Nazi 
party] to help the other players and keep them away from service in the 
front.”26 The Nazi victim Eugen G. exonerated Nitsch in the denazification 
proceedings by saying the latter had performed “actions undermining military 
strength in favor of his many teammates.”27 Nitsch and club secretary Dworak 
further attempted to exonerate the Nazi party member Karl Kochmann, head of 
the Rapid bike section, with the following statement:  
We declare that, with the help of friendly doctors, we have procured fake cer-
tificates for the Rapid players so that they could either be exempted from mili-
tary service entirely, or to at least achieve that they were classified as re-
placement troops and were thus withdrawn from the front and could remain 
with their families. In this operation of undermining the war effort, Herr Karl 
Kochmann was also co-active and had the task of receiving the telephone calls 
and messages of various helpers in this service and passing them on to us. 
This activity was of course associated with great risk and had to be carried out 
with caution, because blowing the cover on this business of undermining the 
war effort would have had the worst consequences for everyone involved.28  
These kinds of declarations, which had the purpose of achieving a deletion 
from the Nazi registry (involving a denazification certificate), were often made 
with the intention of “whitewashing” a person’s Nazi past. 
                                                             
25  Private archive of Franz Binder jr., Franz Binder collection, sworn statement of Franz Binder, 
3 December 1946. 
26  WStLA, 1.3.2.119.A42 – NS registration (45-57), reporting office for the 15th district, M.Nr. 
2465 Leopold Nitsch, Dvoracek declaration, 22 August 1945. 
27  Ibid., Gangl declaration, 30 August 1945., cf. Rosenberg and Spitaler (2011, 253-7). 
28  WStLA, 1.3.2.119.A42 – NS registration (45-57), reporting office for the 15th district, M.Nr. 
2338 Karl Kochmann, declaration, 29 June 1945. 
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6.  Football and Manhunts  
One of the men who helped Oberfeldrichter Dr. Karl Everts pursue self-
mutilators and other “underminers of military strength” was a football player: 
Rapid defender Fritz Durlach, born in 1916 in Vienna (Forster 2007, 48-50). A 
career soldier, he was transferred in October 1943 to the Wehrmacht headquarters 
in Vienna and had also been serving on the patrol from mid-November (Deutsche 
Dienststelle 2008); he first played for SK Rapid in April 1944 (Pichler 2010). 
Georg Schors, a prominent teammate of Durlach’s and one of Rapid’s “greater 
German” championship players in 1941, was also on the patrol service since 
August 1942 (Deutsche Dienststelle 2005).29 On 14 February 1945, Sergeant 
Durlach was assigned to the Investigation Department of the Greater Vienna 
Army Patrol Service, a squad that was responsible for searching for suspects in 
hospitals and for interrogating prisoners on remand. Since Oberfeldrichter 
Everts had to rely on confessions for the conviction of self-mutilators,30 he 
allowed an interrogation room – called the “funhouse” – to be set up in the 
Roßauer Barracks, headquarters of the army patrol, and gave his investigators the 
command to use torture in their interrogations.31 Durlach’s interrogation meth-
ods are documented in the 1947 indictment against members of the army patrol 
service. Regarding the interrogation of Josef K., who had been arrested in Febru-
ary 1945 on charges of “undermining military strength,” it states:  
In the interrogation room, Durlach took from a box a rubber truncheon and a 
wire cable and led Josef K. into the funhouse. Durlach bound him and Dr. Dit-
trich [NCO Dr. Leopold Dittrich] told him to make a confession. Because this 
was not successful, Dr. Dittrich struck Josef K. in the face while Durlach from 
one side and an unidentified soldier from the other side battered K. with fists. 
Dr. Dittrich then said ‘Do with him what you want; kill him for all I care’ and 
walked away. Durlach then worked on K.’s back with the rubber truncheon, 
and the stranger with the wire rope. After each blow, Durlach asked if K. 
wanted to confess. Then K. was placed on a bench and worked on with the 
wire rope again. Then Durlach tied him to the stove and ordered him to go ‘up 
and down’ quickly. When Josef K. could not follow this command because of 
the pain caused by the restraint, Durlach seized K.’s ailing foot and pulled on 
it, so that K.’s arms were almost dislocated. He pulled until the blood ran out 
of his slippers and K. fainted. Now he was brought back to consciousness with 
kicks and confessed.  
                                                             
29  No records can be found on Schors’s participation in Nazi crimes.  
30  ÖSta/AdR, DWM 135/5, court of Division 177, III 78/1944, preliminary investigation report 
of Sergeant Kurt Feigel, 30 September 1944. 
31  The torture command is documented in numerous records from the Nazi era and in the 
cases against Everts and his assistants after 1945. Cf. for example ÖSta/AdR, DWM 135/5, 
court of Division 177, III 78/1944 Rudolf Sobotka proceedings; WStLA G 103-5/1-6, Provin-
cial Court Vienna Vg 6e Vr 196/51 Karl Everts; DÖW V11/1-73, Mikrofilm 1004 u. 1005 [D], 
Vg 7c Vr 915/46 u. Vg 11 Vr 7188/46, “Heeresstreifenprozess“; Forster (2007). 
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Shortly before the liberation of Vienna, Durlach commented to the self-
mutilator Josef D., whom he had abused with blows and kicks: “Do not believe 
that we are toppled, because we still have plenty of hand grenades and revolv-
ers to send you into kingdom come. You’ll be decapitated like so.”32 
After the end of Nazi rule, Durlach initially continued his career with Rapid. 
In the fall of 1945, he played four matches with the team, the last on October 
14, a 5-1 victory over the Wiener Sportclub. Ten days later he was taken into 
custody; according to the Weltpresse (February 21, 1948, 1), one of his victims 
had “recognized [him] on the Rapid pitch and had [him] arrested.” Durlach 
experienced his team’s first championship in the Second Austrian Republic 
from behind bars, and remained in detention until September 1946. Under 
questioning, Durlach denied his alleged crimes and stated that the soldiers 
“uncovered” by his department had largely also been criminals. In addition, he 
claimed to have been severely mistreated in the state police lineup by his for-
mer victims.33 In May 1947, he was charged in front of the Austrian People’s 
Court, together with seven other members of the Investigation Department. 
During the so-called Army Patrol proceedings, he spent another month on 
remand. As a witness to the assertion that he had never tortured prisoners, 
Durlach called the First Vienna FC goalkeeper Stefan Ploc. Ploc had been 
arrested and detained in the Rossauer barracks – probably on suspicion of “un-
dermining military strength” – in March 1945. In the trial, he testified:  
I found myself [...] in the Rossauer barracks until the end of March 1945, but 
did not notice during my detention that detainees were mistreated. I did not 
even receive any punches myself. When I was arrested, Durlach, who was also 
a footballer and knew me from before, saw me. He asked why I was there, and 
when I told him my evidence was not in order he thought that this was non-
sense; he would see to it that I get out again. 34  
The communist Volksstimme (March 18, 1948, 3) reported that Durlach had 
asserted to the court “to have only given a single slap to the face.” The court 
concluded that Durlach had “put prisoners in a painful state and severely 
abused them by the application of beatings, especially with rubber clubs, by 
kicks and the like,” “thereby committing the crimes of torture and mistreatment 
in accordance with § 3 of the KVG [War Crimes Act].” Moreover, “the fre-
quency of the ill-treatment, and the fact that he allowed this abuse to be used as 
a tool by the other members of the investigations unit” were viewed as aggra-
vating factors. Fritz Durlach was sentenced on March 25, 1948 to one year of 
                                                             
32  DÖW V11/1-73, microfilm 1005 [D], Vg 6a Vr 7188/46, indictment 14 May 1947. 
33  DÖW V11/1-73, microfilm 1004 [D] Vg 7c Vr 915/46, hearings 15 January 1946 and 4 Octo-
ber 1946.  
34  DÖW V11/1-73, microfilm 1005 [D], Vg 11f Vr 7188/46 Hv 1053/47, Stefan Ploc testimony, 
24 February 1948. 
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hard labor, to include his pre-trial detention.35 The assessment of this judgment 
in the Austrian daily newspapers differed: while the Weltpresse (March 26, 
1948, 3) saw “severe punishment in the trial of the Army Patrol,” the Volks-
stimme (March 28, 1948, 3) headlined “appalling judgment against the Army 
Patrol” and summed up that the verdict had come out “to the Nazis’ liking.” 
The Social Democrats’ Arbeiter-Zeitung (March 26, 1948, 3) concluded: “On 
the grounds of the rather mild judgment, the Chairman stated that the main 
guilty party for this abuse, Oberfeldrichter Dr. Everts, was unreachable by the 
Austrian courts.” In fact, the two main leaders of the criminal prosecution of 
“underminers of military strength” were never ultimately prosecuted in Austria 
or in the Federal Republic of Germany: Dr. Breitler was in custody for about a 
month in 1946.36 He practiced as a lawyer in Vienna until his retirement in 
1964, representing “Aryanizers,” among others, in restitution proceedings.37 He 
died in 1966.38 A warrant for the arrest of Dr. Everts was indeed issued in Aus-
tria, and he appeared on the “first Austrian list of war criminals” (Das Kleine 
Volksblatt, December 4, 1945, 4; Forster 2007), but he lived unmolested in Ger-
many, where he even served as mayor of his hometown of Ründeroth, and 
worked in the judicial service until his death in 1952 (Baumann et al. 2008, 217). 
7.  Conclusion: Claims of Victimhood and the “Viennese 
Epidemic” 
Comparing the history of football in Vienna during World War II with other 
regions of the Third Reich, similarities initially become visible. These include 
the strategies of the clubs and the local sports officials to maintain strong teams 
as long as possible, despite the war conditions. This is also true for the effects 
of the war on sports operations. Although some prominent Viennese clubs at 
first appear to have retained their “peacetime lineup” for a relatively long time, 
after the beginning of the war of annihilation against the Soviet Union the 
situation in terms of the conscription and front-line deployment of players was 
probably similar to that of the Altreich. Some Viennese clubs, such as First 
                                                             
35  DÖW V11/1-73, microfilm 1005 [D], Vg 11f Vr 7188/46 Hv 1053/47, Judgment of the Pro-
vincial Court for Criminal Matters Vienna, 25 March 1948. 
36  WStLA G 103-5/1-6, Provincial Court Vienna Vg 6e Vr 196/51 Karl Everts, Leopold Breitler 
hearing, 19 April 1946, 2 May 1946, 20 May 1946. 
37  Cf. for example Fünfhaus district court, Rudolfsheim land registry, EZ 1505, restitution 
matter, Jewish Community Vienna vs. R. family, 1948; Döbling district court, Unterdöbling 
land registry, EZ 262, restitution matter, Association for the Care of Needy Orphans vs. B. 
company, 1949; Hietzing district court, Hacking land registry, EZ 66, restitution matter, IKG 
Vienna vs. Eleonore H., 1952. 
38  WStLA Vienna XIII district court, 3A 855/66, estate of Leopold Breitler. 
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Vienna FC, were subsequently more successful than others in assembling 
teams and, as a consequence, in victories on the field. 
After the war, in contrast to the Federal Republic of Germany, Viennese 
football integrated the years 1938 to 1945 into a national victim narrative: 
Football’s sites of memory offered building blocks of Austrian victimhood. 
Unlike the political doctrine of victimhood, however, popular sports memory 
sometimes circumvented the “externalization” of National Socialism. This is 
evidenced by the football-related view that the war itself, more than the An-
schluss – and the end of Austrian sovereignty – was the real break in Austrian 
sporting activities (Spitaler 2008, 554). 
The example of the “Viennese self-mutilation epidemic” that had “infected” 
local football suggests that the Viennese footballers who came largely from the 
proletarian milieu, and who were socialized until 1934 in Social Democratic 
“Red Vienna,” were sometimes lacking in military zeal. The facts put the asser-
tion of the punishment or unfavorable treatment of Vienna footballers with 
regard to the maintenance of sporting operations into perspective, however. On 
the contrary, in the early war years, a preferential treatment or protection of 
Viennese players by local Nazis seems to have actually taken place. The dis-
cussion of such issues was already a topic during the war, but became locally 
patriotic in the Austrian memory: possible preferential treatment became possi-
ble discrimination. 
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